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CRIMINOLOGY
THE EFFECTS OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS
ON POLICE ACTIVITY AND POLICECITIZEN ENCOUNTERS: A RANDOMIZED
CONTROLLED TRIAL*
ANTHONY A. BRAGA
WILLIAM H. SOUSA
JAMES R. COLDREN, JR.
DENISE RODRIGUEZ**
Many have suggested that placing body-worn cameras (BWCs) on
police officers improves the civility of police-citizen encounters and enhances
citizen perceptions of police transparency and legitimacy. In response, many
police departments have adopted this technology to address public concerns
over the quality of policing in their communities. The existing program
evaluation evidence on the intended and unintended consequences of
outfitting police officers with BWCs is still developing, however. This study
reports the findings of a randomized controlled trial involving more than 400
police officers in Las Vegas, Nevada. We find that officers equipped with
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body-worn cameras generated fewer complaints and use of force reports
relative to officers without cameras. BWC officers also made more arrests
and issued more citations than their non-BWC counterparts. The findings of
this randomized controlled trial raise the possibility that planning for the
placement of BWCs on officers should consider the competing effects of
improvement in civilian perceptions of police generated by reductions in
complaints and use of force incidents and of public concerns about increased
enforcement activity.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent deadly police officer-involved shooting events in Baltimore,
Charlotte, Chicago, Ferguson, and elsewhere in the United States have
exposed very concerning rifts in the relationships between the police and the
communities they protect and serve.1 Placing body-worn cameras (BWCs)
on police officers has been suggested as one potentially powerful response to
1

See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-si
ege-after-police-shooting.html (describing conflict between the community of Ferguson,
Missouri and its police force over the controversial death of Michael Brown).
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the current police legitimacy crisis in many U.S. cities.2 Advocates suggest
there are many benefits associated with placing BWCs on police officers.3
BWCs are suggested to increase transparency and citizen views of police
legitimacy, improve police and citizen behaviors during encounters, enhance
evidence collected for the resolution of complaints against the police and the
arrest and prosecution of offenders, and provide improved opportunities for
police training.4 The Obama Administration proposed that Congress provide
the U.S. Department of Justice with $75 million to fund the purchase of and
technical assistance for BWCs.5 In 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimated that over one-quarter of the approximately 18,000 U.S. police
departments had adopted the BWC technology, and the number of police
departments with BWC programs has undoubtedly increased since then.6
Like other police technologies, the rapid adoption of BWCs has
occurred within a low-information environment. As Professor Cynthia Lum
cautions, the rapid adoption of police technologies in the absence of rigorous
empirical evidence about their impact can lead to unanticipated and
unintended consequences that may harm both police and public interests.7
Social scientists are only beginning to develop scientific knowledge about
the effects, expected and unexpected, of the BWC technology.8 For instance,
the evidence on the effects of BWCs on the civility of police-citizen
encounters is still somewhat unclear. Several studies find that BWCs reduce
complaints against police officers and officer use of force reports,9 while
2
See JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN
PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL 1–2 (2015), available at https://www.aclu.org/other/
police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all.
3
Id. at 2.
4
MICHAEL D. WHITE, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., POLICE OFFICER
BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 6–7 (2014).
5
FACT SHEET: STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY POLICING, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/01/fact-sheet-strengtheningcommunity-policing.
6
U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS, 2013 200 (2015).
7
Cynthia Lum, Body Worn Cameras—Rapid Adoption in a Low Information
Environment?, TRANSLATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY 6, 6–7 (2015).
8
CYNTHIA LUM ET AL., EXISTING AND ONGOING BODY WORN CAMERA RESEARCH:
KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2015).
9
See Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and
Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 509, 524–25 (2015); E.C. Hedberg et al., Body-Worn Cameras and Citizen
Interactions with Police Officers: Estimating Plausible Effects Given Varying Compliance
Levels, 34 JUST. Q. 627, 642 (2016); Wesley G. Jennings et al., Evaluating the Impact of Police
Officer Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) on Response-to-Resistance and Serious External
Complaints: Evidence from the Orlando Police Department (OPD) Experience Utilizing a
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other studies find no statistically significant reductions in complaints against
BWC officers10 and a concerning increase in assaults on officers with
BWCs.11
There is also growing evidence that suggests BWCs may result in
increased enforcement activity by police officers. Controlled evaluations
reveal that BWC officers make more arrests and citations relative to their
non-BWC counterparts.12 These unexpected outcomes could undermine
improvements in police-citizen encounters associated with adoption of the
technology in urban environments. To some observers, too many police
departments engage in excessive surveillance and enforcement practices in
urban neighborhoods.13
We examine the effects of BWCs on police activity and police-citizen
encounters in Las Vegas, Nevada. A randomized controlled trial design
involving more than 400 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD) patrol officers tested the impacts of randomly-allocated BWCs on
complaints, use of force reports, and officer activity outcomes for treatment
officers relative to control officers.14 Part I reviews the existing literature on
the impact of BWCs on the civility of police-citizen encounters and police
officer work activities. Parts II and III describe the Las Vegas randomized
experiment and the statistical models used to analyze the outcome data. Part
IV reveals that our experimental analyses found statistically significant
reductions in complaints and officer use of force reports for treatment officers
relative to control officers. However, we also find statistically significant
Randomized Controlled Experiment, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 480, 485 (2015).
10
LYNNE GROSSMITH ET AL., POLICE, CAMERA, EVIDENCE: LONDON’S CLUSTER
RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIAL OF BODY WORN VIDEO 15 (2015).
11
Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body-Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and Do
Not Reduce Police-Use of Force: Results from a Global Multisite Experiment, 13 EUR. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 744, 750 (2016).
12
CHARLES KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS IN
THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 31 (2014); CATHERINE OWENS ET AL., THE ESSEX BWV
TRIAL: THE IMPACT OF BWV ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES OF DOMESTIC ABUSE INCIDENTS
14–15 (2014); Justin Ready & Jacob Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras on
Police-Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 452 (2015).
13
CHARLES EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP
139–45 (2014); VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS
43–73 (2011); Kathryne Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and
the Expansion of the Carceral State, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322 (2016).
14
As will be detailed later in this article, participating LVMPD officers were randomly
allocated to a treatment group that wore the BWCs during the experiment or to a control group
that did not wear the BWCs during the experiment. The control officers served as the
counterfactual condition to evaluate the effects of BWCs on police officer work activities and
the civility of police-citizen encounters.
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increases in arrests and citations made by treatment officers relative to
control officers. We discuss implications of these findings for BWC policy
and practices in the conclusion.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. INFLUENCE ON THE CIVILITY OF POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS

Two theoretical perspectives, deterrence and self-awareness, are
commonly applied to support the position that placing BWCs on officers will
improve the civility of police-citizen interactions by deterring undesirable
behaviors (i.e., not wanting to be recorded on video doing something
inappropriate or illegal) and stimulating desirable behaviors (i.e.,
remembering to treat others with respect).15 Deterrence theory suggests that
crimes can be prevented when the costs of committing the crime are
perceived by the offender to outweigh the benefits.16 Much of the literature
evaluating deterrence focuses on the effect of changing certainty, swiftness,
and severity of punishment associated with certain acts on the prevalence of
those crimes.17 The available research suggests that deterrent effects are
ultimately determined by offender perceptions of sanction risk and
certainty.18
BWCs have been suggested as a deterrent to noncompliance with the
rules of proper behavioral conduct in police-citizen encounters.19 In his
discussion of the influence of cameras on behavior, Professor Nick Tilley
argued that deterrence is one prominent prevention mechanism triggered by
the technology: the presence of a camera “reduces . . . [noncompliance] by
deterring potential offenders who will not wish to risk apprehension and
conviction by the evidence captured on videotape or observed by an operator
on a screen on which their behavior is shown.”20 For officers and citizens
15

Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 516.
FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME
CONTROL 3 (1973).
17
See, e.g., PANEL ON RES. ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, DETERRENCE
AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 96–
97 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); Philip Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying
the Groundwork for the Second Decade, 2 CRIME & JUST. 211, 230–33 (1980); Raymond
Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A
Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173, 173–75 (1987).
18
Daniel Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 201
(2013).
19
See Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 526.
20
NICK TILLEY, UNDERSTANDING CAR PARKS, CRIME, AND CCTV: EVALUATION LESSONS
FROM SAFER CITIES 3 (1993).
16
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alike, the presence of a camera during encounters increases the likelihood
that any misconduct and illegal behaviors will be captured on video and, as
such, generates a deterrent effect by increasing their perceptions of the
likelihood of apprehension and celerity of punishment.21
Self-awareness theory states that when we focus our attention on
ourselves, we evaluate and compare our current behavior to our internal
standards and values.22 This theory further suggests that when human beings
are under observation, they modify their behavior, exhibit more socially
acceptable behavior, adhere to social norms, and cooperate more fully with
the rules.23 People are more likely to align their behavior with personal
standards when made self-aware and believe that they will be negatively
affected if they do not live up to these standards.24 Various environmental
cues and situations induce awareness of the self, such as mirrors, an audience,
or being videotaped or recorded.25 A well-developed line of research
suggests that people do alter their behavior once they know that they are
being observed.26
The presence of BWCs during police-citizen encounters is suggested to
stimulate self-awareness by making these individuals conscious that they are
being watched and their actions are being recorded.27 As a result, police and
citizens alike become self-aware and compare their behavior in the
encounters with objective standards, which are socially desirable behaviors.28
If encounter participants notice a discrepancy between their behavior and
what is socially desirable, then they will alter their behavior.29 As will be
discussed further below, these socially desirable behaviors include
21

See generally Barak Ariel, Increasing Cooperation With the Police Using Body Worn
Cameras, 19 POLICE Q. 331 (2016).
22
T. SHELLEY DUVAL & ROBERT WICKLUND, A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS
10 (1st ed. 1972).
23
Id. at 4.
24
Id. at 10.
25
Id. at 42–51, 100, 101; Paul Silvia & T. Shelley Duval, Objective Self-Awareness
Theory: Recent Progress and Enduring Problems, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 230,
234–35 (2001).
26
See, e.g., Kristen Munger & Shelby Harris, Effects of an Observer on Hand Washing in
a Public Restroom, 69 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 733, 734 (1989); Delroy Paulhus, TwoComponent Models of Socially Desirable Responding, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 598,
606 (1984).
27
Tony Farrar et al., Self-Awareness to Being Watched and Socially Desirable Behavior:
A Field Experiment on the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras and Police Use of Force 9 (2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/The-Effect-of-Body-Worn-Cameras-on-Police-Use-of-Force.pdf.
28
Id. at 2–3.
29
Id. at 3.
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procedurally just treatment of citizens by police officers.30 In summary, there
is solid theoretical support for the use of BWCs as a prevention mechanism
to influence the behaviors of those who are under observation.31 BWCs are
suggested to have both an intrinsic effect (self-awareness theory) and an
extrinsic effect (deterrence theory) on those being watched such that police
and citizens will exhibit socially desirable behavior in their interactions.32
While it remains unclear whether deterrence, self-awareness, or both are
generating the observed effects, several recently completed randomized
controlled trials and quasi-experiments suggest that BWCs improve the
civility of police-citizen civilian encounters by reducing complaints against
officers and officer use of force (both excessive and non-excessive). In the
Rialto, California randomized experiment, officers wearing BWCs during
treatment shifts generated a 90% reduction in complaints and a 50%
reduction in use of force reports relative to officers not wearing cameras
during comparison shifts.33 In Arizona, the Mesa Police Department’s quasiexperimental evaluation of BWCs revealed a 40% reduction in citizen
complaints against treatment officers for misconduct during the study period,
and a 75% decline in use of force complaints.34 In the Orlando, Florida
randomized experiment, BWC officers had a significantly lower prevalence
of response-to-resistance incidents (involving electronic control devices,
chemical agents, impact weapons, and other non-lethal implements) and
lower prevalence of serious external complaints relative to control officers
without BWCs.35 A quasi-experimental evaluation in Phoenix reported a
62% reduction in complaints lodged against treatment officers relative to
control officers.36 In the Mesa, Phoenix, and Rialto studies, many complaints
were resolved quickly due to the accessibility of video evidence.37
While there is some promising evidence that BWCs de-escalate
confrontation and aggression in police-citizen encounters, not all evaluations
support this position. A randomized experimental design was used to
evaluate the effects of BWCs on complaints against officers in the London

30

Id. at 9.
Id. at 2–3.
32
Id. at 9–10; LUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 19; WHITE, supra note 4, at 20–23.
33
Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 523–524.
34
MESA POLICE DEP’T, ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA SYSTEM: PROGRAM EVALUATION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2013).
35
Jennings et al., supra note 9, at 485.
36
Hedberg et al., supra note 9, at 644.
37
KATZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 41; Ian Lovett, In California, a Champion for Police
Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/in-californiaa-champion-for-police-cameras.html?mcubz=3.
31
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Metropolitan Police Service (United Kingdom).38 The study did not reveal
any statistically significant differences in overall complaints made against
officers with BWCs relative to officers not wearing BWCs.39 There were
also no statistically significant differences in self-reported assaults on
officers or injuries for BWC officers relative to control officers.40 A multisite randomized experiment involving 2,122 officers in eight police
departments reported no overall reduction in officer use of force and an
increase in assaults on officers wearing BWCs during treatment shifts relative
to officers not wearing BWCs during control shifts.41 In a re-analysis of the
multisite randomized experiment data, Professor Barak Ariel and his
colleagues show that use of force by treatment officers decreased by 37% in
three sites with high compliance to a BWC policy that required officers to
notify citizens that they were being recorded at the beginning of the
encounter.42 Ariel and his colleagues also reported a 71% increase in officer
use of force in sites with low compliance to the BWC policy.43 Based on
these findings, the authors hypothesized that unchecked BWC discretion may
increase use of force as camera activation during situations with escalating
aggression may further increase aggression during these volatile situations.44
The authors also suggested that verbal notification of video recording by
officers at the commencement of encounters may be helpful in deterring
aggressive behavior and stimulating civil behavior before police-citizen
interactions escalate in a negative direction.45
B. INFLUENCE ON POLICE OFFICER WORK ACTIVITIES

A very small number of studies have examined the effects of BWCs on
police officer work activities, such as their willingness to be proactive,
problem solve, and their discretion in making arrests and citations in
discretionary incidents.46 Survey research suggests that police officers
generally view the technology as facilitating the arrest and prosecution of
criminal offenders by improving the quality of evidence via the creation of a

38

GROSSMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 29–33.
Id. at 15.
40
Id. at 25–26.
41
Ariel et al., supra note 11, at 750.
42
Barak Ariel et al., Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of Body-Worn
Cameras are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten
Randomized Experiments, 12 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 453, 459 (2016).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 461.
45
Id.
46
See, e.g., LUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 19; WHITE, supra note 4, at 13.
39
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permanent record of the events that transpired.47 In agencies considering the
adoption of BWCs, police officers have been noted to express concern over
how camera footage will be used to monitor officer performance.48 Indeed,
officers may fear being reprimanded for not issuing a citation or making an
arrest when a video clearly shows that a citizen has violated the law.49 Both
orientations towards the placement of BWCs on officers—that is, the belief
that offenders are more likely to be held accountable for their transgressions
via the availability of video evidence and the a priori knowledge that
supervisors may scrutinize officer discretion in resolving incidents—seem
likely to influence officer work activities.50
Two controlled studies suggest that officers do increase their law
enforcement activities when outfitted with BWCs. The Phoenix, Arizona
quasi-experimental evaluation concluded that BWCs increased officer
productivity when measured by the number of arrests.51 The evaluators
reported that the number of arrests increased by about 17% among officers
in the BWC treatment group compared to 9% among officers in the
comparison group.52 In the Essex, United Kingdom randomized controlled
trial, Owens and her colleagues found that incidents attended by BWC
officers were more likely to result in criminal charges as compared to
incidents attended by control officers.53
Researchers Ready and Young used a quasi-experimental analysis of
field contact reports to examine whether BWCs influenced Mesa, Arizona
Police Department officer behavior during police-citizen encounters over a
ten-month period.54 The analysis suggested that BWC officers were less
likely to perform stop-and-frisks and make arrests, but were more likely to
give citations and initiate encounters.55 Ready and Young suggested that
47
MARTIN GOODALL, GUIDANCE FOR THE POLICE USE OF BODY-WORN VIDEO DEVICES 87
(2007); ODS CONSULTING, BODY WORN VIDEO PROJECTS IN PAISLEY AND ABERDEEN, SELFEVALUATION 24–28 (2011).
48
POLICE EXECUTIVE RES. F., IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 24–28 (2014).
49
Ready & Young, supra note 12, at 454.
50
BWC advocates suggest that the video evidence will facilitate the arrest and prosecution
of offenders, as it offers a real-time, permanent record of the events that transpired. See, e.g.,
WHITE, supra note 4, at 24. In police departments considering the adoption of BWC, some
officers expressed concerns that the cameras were a signal that their supervisors and managers
did not trust them and that the technology would be used to track and scrutinize their every
move while on duty. See, e.g., POLICE EXECUTIVE RES. F., supra note 48, at 24–25.
51
KATZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 31.
52
Id.
53
OWENS ET AL., supra note 12, at 14–15.
54
Ready & Young, supra note 12, at 448–49.
55
Id. at 454.
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Mesa police officers were more proactive with the BWC technology without
increasing their use of invasive strategies that may threaten the legitimacy of
the organization.56 However, the authors did not assess how initiating
additional encounters with citizens and issuing more citations might impact
police relationships with the communities they serve.57
II. RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. RESEARCH SETTING

The LVMPD provides policing services to some 1.5 million residents of
the Las Vegas metropolitan area.58 In fiscal year 2014–2015, the LVMPD
had roughly 2,600 sworn police officers with nearly 1,400 officers assigned
to the patrol division.59 At the time of the study, the patrol division was
divided geographically into eight “area commands.”60 The area commands,
each headed by a captain, have primary responsibility for preventive patrol,
responding to calls for service, and other proactive activities.61 In 2014, the
Las Vegas metropolitan area had a total index crime rate of 3,839.5 and a
violent index crime rate (or crimes against persons rate) of 532.0 per 100,000
residents.62 LVMPD officers responded to 1,139,777 emergency 911 citizen
calls for service in 2014.63
LVMPD began pilot testing body-worn cameras with a small group of
officers in 2011, around the time that the agency was under intense public
criticism and scrutiny for its use of force policies that ultimately resulted in
a collaborative reform process with the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services.64 The pilot testing period served as
an opportunity for the agency to experiment with different BWC vendors, see
how officers responded to the technology, and draft the Department’s initial
body-worn camera policy.65 By 2013, LVMPD selected Taser International
56

Id.
Id. at 454–55.
58
The basic statistical information presented here was gleaned from the LVMPD 2014
annual report.
LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT,
https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Documents/2014AnnualReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
59
Id. at 13.
60
Id. at 7, 11.
61
Id. at 7.
62
Id. at 9.
63
Id. at 10.
64
JAMES K. STEWART ET AL., COLLABORATIVE REFORM PROCESS: A REVIEW OF OFFICERINVOLVED SHOOTINGS IN THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 6–8 (2012).
65
Id. The American Civil Liberties Union endorsed the LVMPD policy and suggested it
was balanced in terms of transparency and privacy concerns. See Colton Lochhead, ACLU
57
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and its Axon Flex as the vendor and camera to be worn by officers, and an
official body-worn camera policy was developed.66
A modest
implementation of body-worn cameras on 200 officers was planned to test
the impacts of the technology on a range of outcome measures and to guide
a larger deployment of body-worn cameras on patrol officers.67 In 2014,
docking stations that recharged body-worn camera batteries and uploaded
acquired videos to cloud memory storage were installed in four area
commands.68
The LVMPD’s experience with body-worn cameras and willingness to
implement and evaluate them set the stage for a rigorous program evaluation.
With support from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, the LVMPD partnered with an external research team to develop and
execute a randomized controlled trial.69 The research team, Sousa and
colleagues, documented the implementation of the LVMPD body-worn
camera experiment and, despite some operational challenges, concluded that
the intervention was implemented with integrity as body-worn camera
officers generally complied with the policy.70 However, one implementation
challenge involved the recruitment of officers into the randomized controlled
trial. Due to the provisions of the police union contract in place at the time
of the experiment, the LVMPD could not mandate its officers to wear the
body cameras.71 As such, participants in the randomized controlled trials had
to be volunteers who were willing to wear the cameras for at least one year.72
The implications of this design challenge are explored further below.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN

Randomized experimental designs allow researchers to assume that the
only systematic difference between the control and treatment groups is the
Praises Las Vegas Police Body Camera Policy, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (2015),
https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-nevada/aclu-praises-las-vegas-police-bodycamera-policy/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). The LVMPD BWC policy requires that “whenever
possible, safe and practical, officers should inform individuals that they are being recorded.”
LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, 5/210.01 BODY WORN CAMERAS, available at
http://ipicd.com/ceer/files/LVMPD%20BWC%20Policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
66
STEWART ET AL., supra note 64, at 6–8.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
William Sousa et al., Research on Body Worn Cameras: Meeting the Challenges of
Police Operations, Program Implementation, and Randomized Controlled Trial Designs, 19
POLICE Q. 364, 370 (2016).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
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presence of the intervention; this permits a clear assessment of causes and
effects.73 Randomized experiments are valued for their strong internal
validity—that is, the extent to which a research design can eliminate
competing explanations of an observed correlation.74 The randomization
procedure allows the assumption to be made that there are no systematic
differences between officers in the treatment and control groups prior to the
experiment. Since randomized experiments control for confounding factors
by design, analyses of experimental data do not require extensive statistical
modeling to ensure rival causal influences are identified and controlled.75
This randomized controlled trial tested the impact of body-worn
cameras on citizen complaint reports, police use of force incidents, and police
activity measures for treatment officers as compared to control officers over
pre-intervention and intervention time periods. Treatment officers were
requested to wear the body cameras for at least a twelve-month intervention
period. N=416 volunteer patrol officers were identified and randomized to
treatment and control groups beginning in February 2014 and continuing
through September 2014. This extended time period was needed to recruit
eligible patrol officers through informational sessions held in each of the area
commands, randomize volunteer officers from each area command into
treatment and control groups, equip the treatment officers, and train them on
BWC operations and policy. In anticipation of higher levels of attrition in
the treatment group, the randomization procedure was weighted so that 10%
more officers would be allocated to wear body cameras. The randomization
process resulted in the assignment of N=218 officers to the treatment group
and N=198 officers to the control group.
The LVMPD provided the evaluation team with detailed information on
the patrol officers who did participate (N=416) in the randomized controlled
trial as well as the remaining patrol officers (N=955) who did not participate
in the randomized controlled trial. This information included age, race, sex,
rank, time on the job, current assignment, and their unique identification
number. All officers in the randomized controlled trial were closely
monitored over the course of the March 1, 2014–September 30, 2015
intervention period. The data on the officers not participating in the
randomized controlled trial represented a “snapshot” of nonexperimental
officers as of the start of the experiment on March 1, 2014.
73

WILLIAM SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR
GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 13, 246–56 (2002).
74
Id. at 54–55.
75
David Weisburd, Justifying the Use of Non-Experimental Methods and Disqualifying
the Use of Randomized Controlled Trials, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 209, 220–21
(2010).
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Official data on complaint reports and police officer use of force reports
were acquired from the LVMPD Professional Standards Division between
March 1, 2011 and September 30, 2015. The evaluation team matched the
unique officer identification numbers for randomized controlled trial
participants and non-participants to officer identification numbers in the
complaint and use of force report data. Complaints were investigated by the
Internal Affairs Bureau and originate externally from citizens who filed
reports and internally from LVMPD personnel. The complaint report data
included the date and time of the alleged misconduct, the types of allegations
made against the officers, the unique identification number of the officer(s)
alleged to be involved in the misconduct, and disposition information.
According to LVMPD policy, officers are not required to submit reports
on low-level use of force incidents (such as empty hand tactics not involving
strikes, use of baton as an escort tool, handcuffs, other restraints, and
minimum lateral vascular neck restraint), unless the subject is injured or
complains of injury.76 Police officers are required to submit reports on
intermediate use of force incidents (such as use of electronic discharge
devices, empty hand strikes, low-lethality shotguns, baton use with impact,
and pepper spray) and deadly force incidents.77 Police officer use of force
data included the date and time of the incident, the unique identification
number of the officer(s) involved in the incident, and the types of force used
in the incident. It is important to note here that these data do not distinguish
between excessive and non-excessive force applied by LVMPD officers.
C. ASSESSING EXPERIMENTAL GROUP BALANCE AND
GENERALIZABILITY

Randomization provides a simple and convincing method for achieving
comparability in the treatment and control groups.78 If randomization is done
correctly, the only systematic difference between treatment and control
groups should be the presence or absence of the treatment.79 To test the
balance between the treatment and control groups on key officer variables,
we used independent samples (t tests) and standardized mean differences,
known as Cohen’s d.80 Table 1 presents basic descriptive information on
officers participating in the experiment and the results of these tests; for
binary variables, means are expressed as percentages. A positive t test
76

LVMPD Directive GO-021-12, Use of Force, effective June 22, 2012.
Id.
78
SHADISH ET AL., supra note 73, at 248.
79
Id.
80
JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 15–20
(1988).
77
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indicates that the treatment group has a higher mean than the control group.
Covariate imbalance would be exhibited by Cohen’s |d| in excess of .20 and
a |t| in excess of 1.96. The equality of variances was tested and confirmed
for all variables. This reveals that the randomization created balanced
treatment and control groups.
Table 1. Summary Characteristics
Treatment v.

Participants v. Non-

Control

Participants,

Groups,

N=1,371

N=416
Balance

Balance

Diagnostics

Diagnostics

Officer Characteristics

Mean (SD)

t

d

Mean (SD)

t

d

Experimental Group

52.4%

--

--

30.3%

--

--

Male

91.6%

.12

.006

90.6%

.83

.023

White

72.4%

.72

.035

71.4%

.51

.014

Hispanic

13.2%

-.53

.026

14.1%

-.90

.024

Black

8.9%

-.82

.041

7.4%

1.40

.038

Asian/Other

5.5%

.41

.019

7.1%

-1.47

.039

Mean Age

36.77 (7.89)

-1.40

.068

36.40 (7.68)

1.17

.031

Mean Years on Job

9.15 (5.21)

-1.56

.076

8.91 (5.65)

1.07

.028

Patrol Officer II

76.4%

1.01

.049

79.7%

-1.99*

.054

Patrol Officer I

8.7%

-.30

.015

11.0%

-1.84

.049

Sergeant

14.9%

-.96

.047

9.3%

4.79**

.128

Yearly Complaints

.837 (1.137)

1.51

.078

.891 (1.51)

-1.21

.032

.643 (.877)

1.03

.050

.657 (.881)

-.91

.025

Bolden

13.5%

1.05

.051

13.1%

.24

.006

Convention Center

7.2%

.86

.042

11.7%

-3.45**

.093

Downtown

9.6%

-1.01

.049

11.3%

-1.30

.035

Enterprise

19.5%

-.85

.042

14.6%

3.39**

.091

Northeast

19.7%

-.49

.023

13.9%

4.16**

.111

Northwest

17.3%

.85

.042

11.1%

4.99**

.131

South Central

7.5%

1.02

.050

11.1%

-2.84**

.076

2012-2014
Yearly Use of Force
2012-2014

Southeast
5,7%
.28
.014
13.1%
-5.42**
.145
Note: Experimental Group in the Treatment v. Control Group columns designates officers in the treatment group.
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Experimental Group in the Participant v. Non-Participant columns designates officers in the randomized controlled trial.
Binary variable means are expressed as percentages.
* = p < .05
** = p < .01

We also tested whether there were any systematic differences between
patrol officers who participated in the experiment (N=416) and patrol officers
who did not participate in the experiment (N=955) using the same approach
(Table 1). There were no statistically significant differences in sex, race, age,
years on the job, mean yearly complaints, and mean yearly use of force
reports noted between the patrol officers who volunteered to participate in
the randomized controlled trial and those who did not. These data suggest
that officers with higher numbers of complaints and use of force reports did
not seem to avoid participating in the body-worn camera pilot program.
Indeed, on most observable characteristics, the volunteer officers seemed no
different than those officers who chose not to volunteer for the program.
When compared to their non-volunteer counterparts, volunteer officers
were somewhat more likely to be sergeants and to be assigned to the
Enterprise, Northeast, and Northwest area commands and somewhat less
likely to be patrol officers and to be assigned to the Convention Center,
Southeast, and South Central area commands.81 These observed differences
were largely driven by implementation decisions. During the preimplementation recruitment period, LVMPD commanders highly
encouraged sergeants to “lead by example” by volunteering for the bodyworn camera program. These data suggest that many sergeants responded to
this call. The LVMPD located the body-worn camera docking stations in
four area commands: Bolden, Enterprise, Northeast, and Northwest.
Participating officers were required to place their cameras in the docking
stations at the end of the shift so that acquired videos could be uploaded to
cloud memory storage. Patrol officers not assigned to an area command with
a docking station could still participate through an alternative mechanism that
LVMPD established for uploading videos. However, the lack of docking
station infrastructure at those area commands limited the number of officers
who volunteered from them.
The balanced treatment and control groups supports the internal validity
of the design and suggests that the randomized controlled trial was wellpositioned to isolate the impact of body-worn cameras on the study outcome
measures. External validity, however, gauges the extent to which the
81
While the t-tests revealed that the observed differences were statistically significant at
the α=.05 level, the Cohen’s d standardized mean difference metric suggested that these
differences were small (ES<.20). See MARK W. LIPSEY, DESIGN SENSITIVITY: STATISTICAL
POWER FOR EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 55 (1990).
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findings of a study can be generalized to the population of interest.82 A study
can have very high internal validity but be relevant only to a very limited
number of contexts or problems. Inferences about cause-effect relationships
based on a specific scientific study are said to possess external validity if they
may be generalized from the unique and idiosyncratic experimental settings,
procedures, and participants to other populations and conditions.83 The
available data presented here suggest that the findings of this study can be
generalized to other LVMPD officers with the caveat that there are some
small differences in rank and command area.
D. OFFICER ATTRITION

Attrition represents a threat to the internal validity of randomized
experiments as it introduces bias into the analysis of experimental data.84 In
general, attrition from the randomized controlled trial was low: only 10.1%
(42 of 416) of the officers left their assignments during their twelve-month
intervention periods. However, differential attrition was noted for the
treatment officers (N=26, 11.9% of 218) when compared to the control
officers (N=16, 8.1% of 198). In the treatment group, fourteen officers
changed assignments from the patrol division and did not continue wearing
body cameras, seven officers withdrew from the program but stayed in their
current assignment, two officers retired, two officers resigned from the
LVMPD, and one person took a medical leave for a surgical procedure. In
the control group, thirteen officers changed assignments from the patrol
division, two officers resigned from the LVMPD, and one officer retired.
To address the observed attrition issue, we used intention-to-treat (ITT)
analyses based on the initial random assignment to treatment rather than
analyses of the treatment as actually received. ITT analyses provide fair
comparisons between treatment and control groups because it avoids the bias
associated with the non-random loss of study participants.85 As such, all
N=218 treatment officers and N=198 control officers were included in our
analyses.
E. CONTAMINATION OF CONTROL CONDITIONS

One possible threat to the internal validity of any randomized

82

SHADISH ET AL., supra note 73, at 83.
Id.
84
Id. at 323.
85
Sally Hollis & Fiona Campbell, What is Meant by Intention to Treat Analysis? Survey
of Published Randomized Controlled Trials, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 670, 670–71 (1999).
83
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experiment is the diffusion of the treatment into the control group.86 Put
simply, contaminated control conditions undermine the counterfactual
contrast between subjects that receive the treatment and subjects that do not
receive the treatment.87 The stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA) assumes that the effect of some intervention on a given individual
is not related to the treatment assignments of other people (or observational
units).88 In the context of the LVMPD experiment, this could include effects
of treatment officers responding to the same dispatched calls for service as
control officers.
The well-known Rialto, California BWC randomized experiment
experienced possible diffusion of treatment effects, but this was due to the
randomization of BWCs by shift rather than by individual officer.89 In the
Rialto experiment, the same officers participated in treatment (BWC on
during shift) and control conditions (no BWC during shift).90 As such, it was
possible that participating officers carried over the treatment effect into
control shifts. While the evaluation did still find significant reductions in
citizen complaints and use of force incidents during treatment shifts relative
to control shifts, Ariel and colleagues also observed reductions in these
outcome measures during the control shifts, which suggests possible
contamination.91
The LVMPD randomized controlled trial attempted to minimize these
kinds of contamination effects by using different officers in control and
treatment groups. Because LVMPD normally operates with one-officer
patrol units, interaction between officers—and thus the potential for
contamination—is infrequent during a typical shift but does occur when one
officer backs up another on particular calls. Ideally, our randomized
controlled trial would have also separated treatment and control officers into
different policing areas to minimize interactions further. Unfortunately, this
was not possible due to our reliance on volunteer officers to comprise
treatment and control groups. Our research design was not able to prevent
contamination of control conditions, and, as such, our estimates of BWC
impacts on outcomes measures are biased towards the null hypothesis of “no
difference” between treatment and control groups.
86

THOMAS COOK & DONALD CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND
ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 54 (1979).
87
Id.
88
See generally Donald Rubin, Randomization Analysis of Experimental Data: The
Fisher Randomization Test, 75 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 591 (1980).
89
Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 527.
90
Id. at 519–20.
91
Id. at 527.
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We were, however, able to utilize data from LVMPD’s computer-aided
dispatch (CAD) system to monitor and assess the extent of possible
contamination in the experiment. The LVMPD also provided the evaluation
team with CAD data recording citizen calls for service and officer-initiated
calls made between March 1, 2011 and September 30, 2015. In this study,
the analyzed CAD data represented unique call events where duplicate citizen
calls for service for the same event were removed. For instance, in 2014,
LVMPD officers were dispatched to 1,139,777 emergency 911 calls for
service that represented 485,419 unique call events.
The CAD data included the event date and time, call event type, and the
officer(s) responding to the call event; these data also included basic
disposition information that indicated whether the call event generated a
crime incident report, whether responding officer(s) issued citation(s), and
whether responding officer(s) made arrest(s). The evaluation team matched
the unique officer identification numbers for officers in the randomized
controlled trial to officer identification numbers in the CAD data. During the
fifty-five-month observation period, the N=416 officers who participated in
the randomized experiment made N=694,408 responses to dispatched call
events and N=225,368 self-initiated call events. Figure 1 presents the mean
monthly counts of responses to dispatched call events for treatment and
control officers between March 1, 2011 and September 30, 2015. This figure
suggests similar monthly dispatched call response activity levels for both
groups of officers before and during the intervention period.
These data allowed us to determine which officers responded to each
call during the intervention period. As such, we were able to estimate the
percentage of calls for service that involved one or more treatment and
control group officers. Figure 2 reveals very modest contamination between
treatment and control officers occurred each month (from March 2014 to
September 2015); contamination ranged from a low of 15.3% in March 2014
to a high of 20.9% in August 2014, with an average of 19.1% per month.
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III. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
A. OFFICER ACTIVITY OUTCOMES

The CAD data were used to develop key officer activity measures for
the treatment and control officers in the randomized controlled trial during
twelve-month pre-intervention and twelve-month intervention periods. Key
officer activity measures included mean monthly responses to dispatched call
events, mean monthly self-initiated call events, mean monthly call events that
generated crime incident reports, mean monthly call events that resulted in
citations, and mean monthly call events that resulted in arrests per month
during the intervention and pre-intervention study periods. The impact of
BWCs on treatment officer activity (N=218) relative to control officer
activity (N=198) was estimated through the difference-in-differences (DID)
estimator.92 The DID estimates the difference in a treatment officer’s postintervention outcomes at time (t) compared with their pre-intervention
outcomes, relative to the same difference for the control officers in the
experiment.93 The equation for our ordinary least squares panel regression
model was:
1 "#$ = &' + &) *+,-.# + &/ 01+2,3$ + &4 *+,-.# ×01+2,3$ + -#
In this model, the monthly mean number of dispatched call events per
officer was our exemplar outcome measure (Yit). The regressor Groupi is a
92

See, e.g., David Card & Alan Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772, 778
(1994) (using the DID estimator to compare employment in the fast food sector in New Jersey
and in Pennsylvania, in February 1992 and in November 1992, after New Jersey’s minimum
wage rose from $4.25 to $5.05 in April 1992).
93
This randomized controlled trial had very modest statistical power to detect smaller
program effects. With only N=426 officers, this randomized controlled trial had an estimated
statistical power of .531 to detect a small standardized effect size of .20 for a two-tailed test
with α =.05. The modest contamination of control conditions, described above, and the low
prevalence of citizen complaints and officer use of force reports further undermined our ability
to detect smaller program effects. The standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d) between
treatment (N = 218) and control groups (N = 198) during the intervention period revealed
small effect sizes for the outcomes that were consisted with the results reported below. For
instance, the BWC favored a treatment effect on complaints for treatment officers relative to
control officers (d = -.074, SE = .048, p =.128) and on use of force reports for treatment officers
relative to control officers (d = -.089, SE = .041, p =.069). However, the use of the DID
estimator in a panel regression model with pre-intervention and intervention observations for
each officer had the benefit of increasing the statistical power of the research design (416
officers * 2 observations each = 832 total observations) to detect these small effect sizes. See,
e.g., LIPSEY, supra note 81, at 91.
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dummy variable identifying whether an individual officer (i) was in the
treatment group (1) or not (0). The omitted group comprises control officers
in the experiment. The regressor Periodt is a dummy variable for whether
monthly mean number of dispatched call events per officer was during the
intervention period (1) or during the pre-intervention period (0). The
coefficient β3, conforming to the product of the group dummy with the period
dummy, is the DID estimate of the effect of BWCs on the monthly count of
officer-initiated call events. The XTREG command in Stata 14.1 was used
to provide ordinary least squares estimates of the difference-in-differences
described above. To ensure that the coefficient variances were robust to
violations of the homoscedastic error assumption of linear regression models,
robust standard errors clustered by officer were used.
B. COMPLAINT AND USE OF FORCE OUTCOMES

As noted in other BWC evaluations, citizen complaints against officers
and use of force reports were rare events for LVMPD officers.94 Indeed,
during the one-year period preceding inclusion in the randomized controlled
trial, 45.4% of treatment officers (99 of 218) and 52.0% of control officers
(103 of 198) did not experience a single citizen complaint, and 68.8% of
treatment officers (150 of 218) and 73.7% of control officers (146 of 198)
did not generate a single use of force report. When these events occurred, a
large majority of treatment officers and control officers generated only a
single incident during the twelve months immediately preceding the
experiment.95 Given these rare event distributions, we collapsed the observed
counts into binary outcomes (0 = no event, 1 = one or more events) for both
citizen complaint events and use of force events outcomes during twelvemonth pre-intervention and twelve-month intervention periods. DID of
proportions Z tests were then used to estimate whether treatment officers
were less likely to experience complaints and generate use of force reports
relative to control officers between the pre-intervention and intervention
periods.96

94

Ariel et al., supra note 9, at 509.
For instance, for the sixty-eight treatment officers who experienced at least one use of
force report during the pre-test time period: forty-eight had one incident (70.6%), fourteen had
two incidents (20.6%), four had three incidents (5.9%), one had four incidents (1.5%) and one
had five incidents (1.5%). For the fifty-two control officers who experienced at least one use
of force report during the pre-test time period: thirty-seven had one incident (71.2%), ten had
two incidents (19.2%), two had three incidents (3.8%), two had four incidents (3.8%), and one
had seven incidents (1.9%).
96
HUBERT BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 235 (1979) (explaining the use of the differencein-differences of proportions Z tests to evaluate policy interventions).
95
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IV. RESULTS
A. OFFICER ACTIVITY OUTCOMES

Table 2 presents the DID estimator results of the panel regression
models comparing pre-intervention and post-intervention monthly work
activity levels for treatment officers to monthly work activity levels for
control officers. It also presents the pre-intervention and intervention means
and their percent differences for the various activity outcomes for the
treatment and control officers. Holding group and period constant, the BWC
intervention was not associated with any statistically significant changes in
the monthly mean number of responses to dispatched call events, officerinitiated call events, and call events involving crime reports. However,
controlling for group and period, the BWC intervention was associated with
statistically significant increases in the monthly mean number of call events
with citations issued and the monthly mean number of call events with arrests
by the treatment officers relative to the control officers (p<.01 for both
outcomes). Comparing monthly officer means over pre-intervention and
intervention periods, treatment officers generated 5.2% more arrests and
6.8% more citations in their responses to call events relative to control
officers. While these seem like very modest effects on event outcomes, these
increases represent a noteworthy practical impact on the total number of
police-citizen encounters with punitive outcomes. During the twelve-month
treatment period, the officers with body-worn cameras generated an
additional 471 call events involving crime incidents reports with arrests and
an additional 1,125 call events with citations issued relative to their control
officer counterparts.
Table 2. Impact of Body-Worn Cameras on Monthly Mean Officer
Activity Outcomes

Impact (DID
estimator)
Treatment
Officers
PreIntervention
monthly mean
Intervention
monthly mean
Percent mean
difference

Dispatched
Calls
.021 (.025)

OfficerInitiated
.006 (.008)

Crime Incidents

Citations

Arrests

-.002 (.009)

.685 (.036)**

.352 (.019)**

29.85

9.44

11.00

10.27

6.87

30.24

9.56

11.13

11.08

7.30

+1.3%

+1.3%

+1.2%

+7.9%

+6.3%
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Control
Officers
Pre30.61
9.68
11.28
10.53
7.04
Intervention
Monthly Mean
Intervention
30.98
9.80
11.41
10.65
7.12
Monthly Mean
Percent mean
+1.2%
+1.2%
+1.2%
+1.1%
+1.1%
difference
Percent Mean
+0.1%
+0.1%
0.0%
+6.8%
+5.2%
Difference-indifferences
N=832
observations
(416 officers *
2 observations)
Note: Group and period covariates were included in the ordinary least squares panel regression models but not shown
here. Robust standard errors clustered by officer are in parentheses. There were N=218 treatment officers and N=198
control officers included in this analysis.
* = p < .05
** = p < .01

B. CITIZEN COMPLAINTS AND USE OF FORCE OUTCOMES

Between the pre-intervention and intervention periods, the percentage
of treatment officers that generated at least one complaint decreased by
16.5% from 54.6% to 38.1% (Table 3). By comparison, between the preintervention and intervention periods, the percentage of control officers that
generated at least one complaint decreased by only 2.5% from 48.0% to
45.5%. The absolute differences in the share of officers with at least one
complaint between the treatment and control groups over the pre-intervention
and intervention periods represented a 14.0% reduction in favor of the
treatment group (Z = 2.035, p < .05). The proportional difference between
the two groups over time represented a larger 30.2% reduction in the
percentage of treatment officers relative to control officers who generated at
least one citizen complaint.
Similar significant reductions were noted in the likelihood that a
treatment officer generated at least one use of force report during the
intervention period. Between the pre-intervention and intervention periods,
the percentage of treatment officers that generated at least one use of force
report decreased by 11.5% from 31.2% to 19.7% (Table 4). By comparison,
between the pre-intervention and intervention period, the percentage of
control officers that generated at least one use of force report increased by
1.0% from 26.3% to 27.3%. The absolute differences in the share of officers
with at least one use of force report between the treatment and control groups
over the pre-intervention and intervention periods represented a 12.5%
reduction in favor of the treatment group (Z = 2.057, p < .05). The
proportional difference between the two groups over time represented a
larger 40.7% reduction in the percentage of treatment officers relative to
control officers who generated at least one use of force report.
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Table 3. Impact of Body-Worn Cameras on Citizen Complaint Reports
and Officer Use of Force Incidents
Citizen Complaint

Officer Use of

Reports

Force Incidents

Treatment, N=218

Control, N=198

Treatment, N=218

Control, N=198

Pre-Intervention

54.6%

48.0%

31.2%

26.3%

Intervention

38.1%

45.5%

19.7%

27.3%

% Absolute Change

-16.5%

-2.5%

-11.5%

+1.0%

% Proportional

-30.2%

-5.2%

-36.9%

+3.8%

Change
Difference-indifferences
% Absolute Change

-14.0%

-12.5%

% Proportional

-25.0%

-40.7%

2.035*

2.057*

Difference
Z-Test results
* = p < .05
** = p < .01

These analyses also suggest that the modest contamination of control
conditions noted by our analyses of call event responses did not result in
diffusion of treatment effects or SUTVA violations in complaint and use of
force incidents for control officers during the intervention period. Indeed,
between the pre-intervention and intervention periods, the percentage of
control officers with at least one complaint decreased by only 2.5% and the
percentage of control officers with at least one use of force incident increased
by 1.0%.97 The presence of treatment officers with cameras at roughly one
in five call events attended by control officers during the intervention period
had no significant influences on how the control officers handled interactions
with citizens.
We also conducted an exploratory analysis of the disposition of
complaints against police officers during the intervention time period.98
97

The difference of proportions test result for the percentage of control officers with at
least one complaint between the pre-intervention and intervention periods was Z = 0.4985,
p = .6181. The difference of proportions test result for the percentage of control officers with
at least one use of force report between the pre-intervention and intervention periods was Z = 0.2246, p = .8223.
98
A formal DID analysis was not possible due to 18.9% (76) of the 404 allegations against
eighty-three treatment officers with at least one complaint and 18.7% (74) of the 396
allegations against eighty-nine control officers with at least one complaint incident not having
dispositions at the time the data were provided to the evaluation team.
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Complaints against officers can have multiple allegations of misconduct.99
The eighty-three treatment officers with at least one complaint during the
intervention time period had 328 allegations with formal dispositions
completed while the eighty-nine control officers with at least one complaint
during the intervention time period had 322 allegations with formal
dispositions. BWC officers were modestly less likely to have the allegations
in the complaints against them sustained and dispositions were made more
quickly than their control officer counterparts. Some 14.9% of the 323
allegations against treatment officers and 19.9% of the 322 allegations
against control officers were sustained against the officers. The 5.0% actual
reduction difference (-25.1% proportional reduction difference) was
statistically significant at a less restrictive p <.10 level (Z = -1.682). Body
cameras also resulted in a statistically significant -15.5 day reduction
(t = -3.304, p <.01) in the mean number of days between an allegation being
made and disposed for officers in the treatment group (mean = 49.3, standard
deviation = 57.2) relative to officers in the control group (mean = 64.8,
standard deviation = 62.3).
CONCLUSION
The results of our randomized controlled trial suggest that the placement
of BWCs on LVMPD officers reduced complaints and use of force reports
for treatment officers relative to non-BWC comparison officers. These
results support the position that BWCs may de-escalate aggression or have a
civilizing effect on the nature of police-citizen encounters. Research
suggests that police disproportionately use force when attempting to control
or apprehend suspects in disadvantaged, minority neighborhoods.100
Minority citizens are also more likely to feel that they experience
disrespectful treatment at the hands of officers.101 The complaint and use of
force reductions associated with placing BWCs on police officers may be
particularly important for improving police-community relations in
impoverished, minority neighborhoods.
The presence of BWCs in police-citizen encounters also seemed to
result in quicker resolutions of complaint allegations against treatment
officers relative to control officers. The availability of video evidence on the
99

One control officer with 126 allegations stemming from a single complaint incident was
excluded from this analysis as an outlier.
100
Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 867, 887
(2002).
101
RIOS, supra note 13, at 5; Rod Brunson, ‘Police don’t like black people’: African
American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71,
85 (2007).
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nature of the encounter seemed to allow internal affairs investigators to make
quicker dispositions of complaints. However, it is important to note here that
the reductions in citizen complaints may not reflect a substantive change in
police-citizen behavior during interactions. The observed reductions could
simply reflect a reduction in citizens filing frivolous complaints against BWC
police officers.102 Indeed, the modest reduction in complaint allegations
sustained against BWC officers relative to control officers suggests that there
were fewer legitimate complaints lodged against officers wearing the
cameras.
Future research should attempt to interview citizens and police officers
immediately following interactions to determine whether the BWCs do
indeed have a calming effect. It would also be important to unravel the
theoretical mechanisms associated with any behavioral changes influenced
by the introduction of cameras to police-citizen encounters. From the
standpoint of improving police-community relations, of course, the
distinction between deterrence and self-awareness is irrelevant; that is, it only
matters whether an intervention “works” by improving individual
behavior.103 However, determining whether deterrence, self-awareness, or
some combination of the mechanisms associated with both theoretical
perspectives would be important in developing further refinements to BWC
deployments and policy.104
BWCs have been suggested to increase transparency in policing and, as
a result, improve citizen views of police legitimacy.105 Behavioral changes
for BWC officers in police-citizen encounters represent key components of
Professor Tom Tyler’s process-based model of police legitimacy: public
voice, neutrality in decision-making, trustworthiness, and treatment with
dignity and respect.106 Citizens are suggested to respond to BWC officers’
102

See also KATZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 41; WHITE, supra note 4, at 20–21.
See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Jens Ludwig, The Silence of the Lambdas: Deterring
Incapacitation Research, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 287, 288 (2007). Miles &
Ludwig draw a similar substantive policy conclusion when assessing the relative impact of
incarceration through on individual offending rates through incapacitation and deterrence
crime control mechanisms.
104
For instance, if encounter participants noted that they were deterred from aggressive
behavior by an initial announcement that the interaction was being recorded, it might be
important to make such announcements mandatory for all police-citizen encounters where a
BWC is present. Further, if non-BWC officers report that responding to calls where BWC
officers were present stimulated procedurally-just behavior because they were made more
aware of their own decision-making processes, BWCs could be strategically allocated to
maximize these kinds of second-order impacts.
105
STANLEY, supra note 2, at 2.
106
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME
& JUST. 283, 284 (2003).
103
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behavioral changes by viewing them as more legitimate and, in turn, become
more willing to cooperate with the police.107 Placing BWCs on police
officers may also influence other dimensions of police legitimacy, such as
police accountability, distributive justice, and crime control effectiveness.
As suggested by others, police legitimacy is substantially more complex than
ensuring procedurally-just encounters with citizens.108
The video recording of police-citizen encounters could enhance citizen
perceptions of transparency and accountability in the day-to-day work of the
officers that serve them. Lawfulness certainly matters to citizens when they
appraise the legitimacy of the police; putting BWCs on officers may increase
their adherence to the rule of law when stopping, searching, frisking, and/or
arresting citizens.109 BWC officers also might be less likely to allow extralegal factors, such as the race of suspected offenders, to influence their
decision-making, thereby improving distributive justice.110 Finally, citizen
perceptions of police effectiveness have been found to be related to
assessments of police legitimacy.111 Placing BWCs on officers could
generate a deterrent effect on crime by increasing offenders’ perceived risk
of apprehension and punishment by capturing critical evidence on video that
could be used against them in court proceedings. Unfortunately, there is little
evidence available on the varied impacts that BWCs could have on the
different aspects of police legitimacy.112
In this randomized controlled trial, we found that BWC officers
generated more arrests and issued more citations than their control
counterparts. Further research is needed to determine whether these
increases in enforcement activity were driven by enhanced officer confidence
that the video evidence collected would be used to hold offenders
accountable for their transgressions, officers’ concerns that supervisors who
view videos of the interactions would hold them accountable for their
discretionary actions, or both. Further research would help determine
whether increased arrest and citation activity affected communities of color
107

Ariel, supra note 21, at 352–53.
Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic
Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 168–70
(2012); Justice Tankebe, Public Cooperation with the Police in Ghana: Does Procedural
Fairness Matter?, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1265, 1265–67 (2012).
109
Justice Tankebe, Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of Public Perceptions
of Police Legitimacy, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 103, 108–09 (2013).
110
Michael Reisig et al., The Construct Validity and Refinement of Process-Based
Policing Measures, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005, 1024 (2007).
111
Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 108, at 146–47; Tankebe, supra note 108, at 1275–
83.
112
LUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 19; WHITE, supra note 4, at 19–20.
108
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or other concerned communities disproportionately. It is also unknown how
the observed increased enforcement activity of BWC officers might influence
police legitimacy. It is possible that increased enforcement activity
associated with BWCs might enhance legitimacy by improving police
effectiveness in controlling crime and their capacity to hold offenders
accountable.
Alternatively, increased enforcement activity could undermine police
legitimacy if citizens view heightened arrests and citations as harmful to their
communities. Citizens’ appraisals of the police are influenced by the style of
policing in their communities.113 Policing strategies that emphasize
increased investigative stops, criminal summonses, and misdemeanor arrests
across jurisdictions have been shown to generate concern regarding racial
disparities114 and are suggested to contribute to the increased incarceration of
young minority males.115 The findings of this randomized controlled trial
raise the possibility that, in our most vulnerable neighborhoods, increased
enforcement activity associated with the placement of BWCs on officers
could possibly undermine improvement in citizen perceptions of the police
generated by reductions in complaints and use of force incidents.
Former President Obama’s Task Force on Twenty-First Century
Policing recommended that police departments need to include “an
evaluation or assessment process to gauge the effectiveness of any new
technology, soliciting input from all levels of the agency, from line officer to
leadership, as well as assessment from members of the community.”116
Unfortunately, BWCs have been adopted by many urban police departments
without much scientific evidence available to guide implementation.117 To
some observers, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, BWCs are “a
[w]in [f]or [a]ll when implemented with the right policies in place.”118
However, without fuller understanding of the intended and unintended
consequences of this new technology, it is difficult to know what the “right”
policies are. The findings of this study suggest that as this body of scientific
evidence continues to develop, jurisdictions should implement BWCs with
eternal vigilance to both intended and unintended consequences.
113
See, e.g., RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA:
CONFLICT AND REFORM 39–44 (2006).
114
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography
and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY AND
POLICING 338–39 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 1st ed. 2010).
115
EPP ET AL., supra note 13, at 139–145, 155–60.
116
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 35 (2015).
117
LUM ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
118
STANLEY, supra note 2, at 1.

